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Abstract

This paper focuses on the causes of increased wage inequality in OECD
countries in recent years and its decomposition into the component factors of
trade surges in low wage products and technological change that has preoccupied the trade and wages literature. It .argues that the length of production
run and degree of fixity of factors is crucial in such analyses. In particular,
if the observed wage inequality response to price and technology shocks reflects a short-run response in which factors and output have not adjusted
fully across industries, then decomposition analysis of the causes of the observed increases in inequality is substantially altered relative to a long-run
factors mobile world. This conclusion applies both when one type of labour
has mobility costs and in the Ricardo-Viner case where there is an additional, sectorally immobile factor. Furthermore, only small departures from
the fully mobile model can greatly change decompositions. This finding is
important because most data used in earlier work are interpreted as reflective of a long-run full mobility response, when this may not be the case.
Incorrect conclusions as to how trade surges and technology contribute to
wage inequality can be easily drawn, if the data are in fact generated by a
short-run adjustment process.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on the causes of increased wage inequality in OECD
countries in recent years, more specifically its decomposition into the component factors of trade surges in low wage products and technological change
that has preoccupied the trade and wages literature1 . We argue that if we
assume that if the observed wage inequality response to price and technology
shocks reflects a short-run response in which factor allocations and output
have not fully adjusted across industries, then decomposition analysis of the
causes of the observed increases in inequality is substantially altered relative
to a long-run world in which all factors are mobile. This finding is important because most data used in the debate are interpreted as reflective of a
long-run full mobility response, when this may not be the case. Incorrect conclusions as to how trade surges and technology contribute to wage inequality
can be easily drawn if the data are generated by a short-run adjustment
process.
We examine two cases of factor immobility: a two-factor model where
one factor is subject to mobility costs, and a Ricardo-Viner model with a
third factor, immobile in the model run. In both cases, relatively small
departures from the fully mobile Hecksher-Ohlin model greatly change the
decomposition results.
1

See Wood (1994), Haskel and Slaughter (1998), Slaughter (1999) and Leamer (1998).
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2.
LONG AND SHORT RUN MODELS FOR TRADE AND
WAGES ANALYSIS
We use trade-based models to decompose the observed change in skilledunskilled wage inequality in the UK between 1979 and 1995 to evaluate the
relative importance of world prices (trade changes) and technological progress
(whether sector- or factor-biased) in generating wage change. We compare
results from short-run models in which some factors are either immobile
of face adjustment costs moving between sectors, to those from a longerrun Hecksher-Ohlin type model where all factors are fully mobile between
industries.
Models where not all factors can move easily between sectors (Mayer,
Mussa, 1974, and Neary, 1978) have investigated the implications of this feature for relative incomes in a two-factor model (such as whether the StolperSamuleson theorem still holds) and are the starting point for this paper. In
these papers, the factor inputs are labour and capital, with capital immobile
between sectors.
We discuss the case where the factor inputs are unskilled (U ) and skilled
(S) labour, with U being the factor subject to adjustment costs. In this
case, if there is a fall in the world price of the U -intensive good, with S
freely mobile between sectors, then since U cannot easily move towards the
S-intensive sector in the short run, its wage will rise in the expanding sector
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and fall more steeply than the goods price in the declining sector. The wage of
S will fall in the short run, though by less than that of the U-intensive good.
In the longer run, as factor U becomes free to move towards the S-intensive
sector where its wage is higher, the output of this sector will expand. Given
the shift towards the S-intensive sector, S’s wages will rise, while U ’s wage
will fall further in both sectors2 . This relative wage eﬀect reflecting the shift
over time in factors can be more marked than the initial impact eﬀect of the
price shock, and is the main factor behind the long-run Stolper-Samuelson
influences on relative wages (a fall in the U-intensive good price will reduce
U’s wage and raise S’s wage).
Although U ’s income will fall sharply in the U -intensive sector when the
goods price falls, it will actually fall further, rather than be mitigated, once
U becomes free to move to the other sector, as S’s share of income gets bid
up by the shift of output to the S-intensive sector. This suggests that some
2

The mechanism behind this seemingly counter-intuitive result can be seen as follows.
Looking at a 2-good, 2-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model, compare a base case and two cases,
V , where both factors are variable, and F , where factor U is fixed in particular sectors.
Both V and F see an identical fall in the world price of the U -intensive good. In case V ,
both factors move out of M to sector E, and there is a change in output composition. As
the export good is much more intensive in S, the relative wage of S is driven up and that
of U falls.
In case F , U is immobile. As sector M contracts, S is still free to move to sector E, but
the expansion of that sector is greatly dampened because of a shortage (in that sector) of
unskilled factor U (which drives up U ’s wage in the expanding sector E). Consequently,
there is much less demand for S, and its wage does not rise as in case V . Since S is cheaper,
and the price of output of good E is the same in case V as case F in a Heckscher-Ohlin
model, it follows that the wage of U is higher in case V than case F , even in the declining
sector.
For more formal proof please contact the authors.
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of the conclusions of the short-run model may diﬀer from the longer-run H-O
model, in that much of the impact of trade on relative facator rewards takes
place only as trade and output here are able to change (the ’magnification’
eﬀect). Also factor price insensitivity to endowments does not apply when
not all factors are able to move, so any ‘short-run’ study of the causes of
changing wage inequality needs to take account of changing endowments,
not simply world prices and technology.
This conclusion is supported by our alternative, Ricardo-Viner case, where
both types of labour are mobile, but capital is immobile. Again, the capital
immobility greatly reduces the shift in output between sectors in response
to a price change, and this has a very large damping eﬀect on changes in
labour demand and wages. Sector output movement and changes in factor
demand are greatly reduced even when only 2% of value added comprises a
fixed factor.
We consider the possibility that the changes in relative wages observed
in a small open economy reflect the short-run response of the economy to a
combination of world price, technological and demographic shocks. The procedures we employ are to calibrate a numerical general equilibrium model to
the UK economy using data for 1979 and 1995, and then to make computations to decompose the observed change into component parts by considering
the eﬀects of changes separately. We use a Heckscher-Ohlin model, which
6

assumes that factors can freely move between sectors, a short-term model
which incorporates adjustment costs for unskilled labour and a Ricardo-Viner
model.
2.1 A Long-run Trade and Wages Model
For our long-run model, we use a 2-factor, 2-sector Heckscher-Ohlin type
formulation of a small, open economy3 .

Of the two sectors, sector E (ex-

portables) is assumed to be intensive in the use of skilled factor S compared to
unskilled factor U relative to sector M (importables): ie UE /SE < UM /SM .
This holds for any pair of wage rates Wu and Ws (ie there are no factor
intensity reversals). The factor input-output ratios for E and M , auE , asE ,
auM and asM are all functions of Wu and Ws .
We assume both labour markets are perfectly competitive. In equilibrium,
these markets will clear, and factor prices and the associated input-output
ratios and goods outputs will all adjust to clear the two factor markets. These
equilibrium conditions imply that

auE (WU , WS ) .YE + auM (WU, WS ) .YM = U

(1)

asE (WU , WS ) .YE + asM (WU , WS ) .YM = S
3

Strictly speaking, Heckscher-Ohlin trade models provide an explanation of trade patterns between countries in terms of relative factor abundance. We use the term here to
refer to a mobile factors formulation of a single country.
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where YE and YM are outputs of the two goods and U and S are the economy
wide endowments of unskilled and skilled labour.
Competition ensures prices equal unit costs in both sectors, ie

auE (Wu , WS ) .WU + asE (Wu , WS ) .WS = P E

(2)

auM (Wu , WS ) .WU + asM (Wu , WS ) .WS = P M

where P E and P M are the two goods prices set on the world market.
In order to capture the separate eﬀects of factor- and sector-biased technical progress, we use a CES production function for each sector of the form
k
l(σi /(1+σi ))
Yi = Ai β i (αu Ui )((1+σi )/σi ) + (1 − β i ) (αs Si )((1+σi )/σi )

(3)

where Ai is a scale parameter, σ i is the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labour in production, β i is a share parameter and αu
and αs are factor-augmenting technical change parameters. We can interpret
an increase in Ai as representing a general increase in total factor productivity
in sector i, which is purely sector-biased in its eﬀects. Changes in αu and
αs represent technical progress which increases the productivity of one factor
across both sectors (factor biased technological change).
Diﬀerentiation of these production functions yields the following first-

8

order conditions:

Wu = Pi .Ai . (Yi /Ai .Ui )−1/σi β i (.αu )σi /(1+σi )

(4)

Ws = Pi .Ai . (Yi /Ai .Si )1/σi . (1 − β i ) (.αs )σi /(1+σi )

If we make the simplifying assumption that the elasticity of substitution
between factors is the same in both sectors (σ i = σ for all i) the eﬀects of
various influences on the ratio of skilled to unskilled wage rates can be summarized in this model by equation (5) (derived by rearranging the indirect
cost functions for the two industries). This links relative wage rates to relative
goods prices over the price range for which where there is no specialisation:


Ws /Wu = [θ um . (PE .AE /PM .AM )1+σ − θuE ]/[θSE − θ SM . (PE .AE /PM .AM )1+σ ] .
(5)

Where the θ parameters represent the composite eﬀect of share and factoraugmenting change for each sector and each factor, ie
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θsi = (1 − β i )−σ /αs1+σ
= θui β i −σ /αu1+σ
i = {E, M }

(6)

In this formulation, Ws /Wu is higher the larger is PE or AE , and the
smaller is PM or AM . An increase in αu /αs will reduce Ws /Wu (this is the
same result as in Davis (1997) and Haskel and Slaughter (2002)). Changes
in the CES share parameters, β, however, have ambiguous eﬀects on relative
wages.
As Abrego and Whalley (2000) note, following Harry Johnson (1966), in
the CES case specialization can occur for surprisingly small changes in goods
prices. If specialization does occur, beyond this point traded goods prices
do not aﬀect relative wages, though changes in factor supplies will have an
influence.
It is perhaps worth noting that the model equations outlined above do
not contain any statement of consumer demand or utility. In this framework,
prices of all goods are set on the world markets, and consumer demand at
home does not aﬀect prices or output if we assume the economy is small
and open. This means that the production and consumption sides of the
10

economy are separable; and given our focus on the determination of relative
wage change we can concentrate on modelling the production side alone. The
same argument appies for the short run model to which we turn next.
2.2 A Short-run Adjustment Model of Trade and Wages
We formulate a short-run trade and wages model similar to the long-run
model above, but in which labour cannot move costlessly between sectors due
to adjustment costs. These may be search costs, transportation or removal
costs, transactions costs in housing markets, or even psychological costs and
preference for location.
In the model, we assume these transactions costs create a wedge between
the wage oﬀered in the sector where labour is currently employed and the
wage needed to be oﬀered in another sector in order for a worker to move.
Wage rates in sectors which are expanding following an international price
shock to the economy are thus higher than those in contracting sectors where
labour shedding occurs.
In this model, factor U will only move from a declining sector M to an
expanding sector E if wages in E exceed those in M by some proportionate
amount λui : ie if WuE − WuM ≥ λu .WuM , and likewise for factor S if it also
faces adjustment costs. This means there are 3 kinds of sectors; expanding
sectors, where employers pay a high wage (gross of adjustment cost); declining sectors where the wage is lower, but adjustment costs are lower; and
11

sectors where employment is not changing. These sectors are paying wages
high enough that their labour force does not find it attractive to move to the
expanding sector once adjustment costs are taken into account.
In expanding sectors, we define the wage gross of adjustment costs as
WUg i where i ⊂ e, the set of expanding sectors. The wage net of adjustment
costs WUni = WUg i /(1 + λU ). In declining sectors (i ⊂ d, the set of declining
sectors) the wage rate will be the same as the wage in expanding sectors
net of adjustment costs is WU j = WUnj = WUg j /(1 + λU )(where j ⊂ e is the
set of expanding sectors). A sector i will be have unchanged employment
if its wage lies between WUg j and WUg j /(1 + λU ).(where, once again j is an
expanding sector j ⊂ e).
To capture these features we modify equation (4) to apply diﬀerent wages
to diﬀerent sectors, expressing wages in all sectors in relation to the gross
wage in the expanding sectors: WUg j where j ⊂ e. We will call this our
reference wage, and label it as WUR . As we consider a two sector model, we
can limit ourselves to only expanding and contracting sectors.
For each sector, we express the proportional diﬀerence between the wage
received by labour in the unskilled intensive sector WUR , and the (gross of
adjustment cost) wage paid by employers, WUg as lUi . This allows us to characterize the diﬀerence in sectoral wage rates as follows:
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In expanding sectors (i ⊂ e) : lUi = 0
In declining sectors (i ⊂ d) : lUi = λu

(7)

We define the benchmark (pre-shock) levels of employment of U and S
in each sector as Ui∗ and Si∗ ; the levels of employment if nobody leaves the
sector. In a declining sector i(i ⊂ d, ) adjustment costs mean that the wage
discount factor lUi equals the maximum permitted, λu , and labour can moves
(ie the sector is ‘declining’).
The adjustment costs borne by those factors which move (which may
be in the form of either temporary unemployment or a loss of productive
eﬃciency) are given by:

µu = WuR .
µs = WsR .

[
i

lui . (Ui∗ − Ui )

i

lsi . (Si∗ − Si )

[

(8)

If adjustment costs are denominated in labour, this reduces eﬀective econ-
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omywide endowments
[
i

Ui = U − Mui /WuR

i

Si = S − Msi /WsR

[

(9)

The eﬀects of introducing adjustment costs into the model are thus: i)
the wage of each factor will now diﬀer between sectors by a proportion λU
for U and λs for S. (ii) factors are now less mobile in response to a price or
other shock. In particular, there is a range of traded goods prices over which
factors will not move, and this is wider the larger are λu and λs . (iii) following
Neary (1998) reduced mobility reduces the eﬀects of price changes on relative
wage changes in both sectors. (iv) because of the eﬀects of the adjustment
costs on factor movements and relative wages, the specialisation eﬀects in a
classical Heckscher-Ohlin model less likely to occur. The model is easier to
reconcile with observed data, where extreme changes in specialisation are not
observed. (v) if we assume that in the long run λu and λs are zero, a price
change will have larger eﬀects on output, employment and wages in the long
run than over the short-run. (vi) the long-run model is simply the short-run
model with the parameters λu and λs set to zero.
2.3 A Ricardo-Viner Fixed Factor Model of Trade and Wages
Our Ricardo-Viner model utilizes a nested CES function to combine three
14

factors: unskilled labour, U , skilled labour, S, and capital.

Skilled and

unskilled labour are mobile across sectors with a common wage, WS , WU ,
while capital is sector specific, set at a level Ki . A CES nesting structure is
used in which the two types of labour are used in each sector i are combined
to form aggregate labour Li using a CES aggregate. This is then combined
with capital in a Cobb-Douglas function to yield total sectoral output, Yi .
The CES aggregation function for the sectoral labour aggregate, Li , is of
the same form as equation (3)
k
lσi /(1+σi )
Li = Ai β i . (αu .Ui )(1+σi )/σi + (1 + β i ) (αs .Si )(1+σi )/σi

(i = u, s)
(10)

We can diﬀerentiate this to obtain first order conditions for the two wages
WU and WS in terms of a sectoral aggregate wage Wi and Li :

σ i /(1+σi )

WU = Wi .Ai . (Li /Ai Ui )−1/σi .β i .αu

WS = Wi .Ai . (Li /Ai Si )−1/σi . (1 − β i ) .αs

(i = u, s)

σi //(1+σ i )

(11)

(i = u, s)

The aggregate labour wage, Wi is given by :

Wi = (Wu .Ui + Ws .Si ) /Li

15

(12)

The Cobb-Douglas aggregation of Li and Ki to form Yi is given by: Yi =
γ

1−γ i

Υi Ki i .Li

where γ i is the capital share coeﬃcient for industry I, Υi is a scale coeﬃcient and from the first order conditions

Wi .Li = (1 − γ i ) .Pi Yi
Ri = γ i .Pi Yi

where Ri is the rental return to capital.
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(14)

3. CALIBRATION AND DATA
To use these models in decomposition experiments to assess the relative
importance of trade surges and technological change for changes in wage inequality, we can calibrate each to observed data for 1979 and 1995 for the
UK. Since we compare the eﬀects of alternatively assuming changes between
those dates represent either short- or the long-run responses, we use three
calibrations. In the Ricardo-Viner model we have three factors: capital,
skilled and unskilled labour. In the other two versions (Heckscher-Ohlin or
H-O, and partial mobility) we reallocate capital income from our database
proportionately by sector, so the simplified model just has two factors. The
H-O model diﬀers from the partial mobility one in that λu and λs are set
to zero: calibration based on this assumption means assuming a long-run
equilibrium in the economy (ie the standard H-O model), whereas with λu
set at a non-zero level we are assuming the economy is at a short-run equilibrium only. This latter treatment means that the adjustment process for
the unskilled factor reflects an outcome influenced by short-run adjustment
costs.
To calibrate either the H-O or partial mobility models to the start- and
end-years, we solve the model for parameter values given data for the two
years, 1979 and 1995 with prices, wages, output and employment set at their
observed values. We assume a value for the elasticity of substitution between
17

factors in production σ (we assume the same elasticity for both sectors, to
rule out the possibility of factor intensity reversals), and we assume values
for the diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled wages in the expanding
and declining sectors E and M . The unknowns at this stage are the model
parameters for each sector and each time period (αuit , αsit , β it and Ait ).
We use the eight first-order conditions for cost-minimising behaviour
(equations for 2 factors for 2 sectors for 2 years, (1979 and 1995)).

i /(1=σi )
Wuit = Pti .Ait . (Yit /Ait .Uit )l/σi .β it .αsσ
it

(15)

sσ /(1+σ i )

Wst = Pti .Ait . (Yit /Ait .Sit )l/σi . (1 − β it ) .αit i

We assume a value for the elasticity of substitution between factors in
production, which we also assume to be constant across sectors (we carry out
the calibration and simulations for a central case σ = 1.25 with sensitivity
values of σ = 0.5 and σ = 2.0). Using this, it is possible to calibrate the
model so as to generate values of the technical coeﬃcients (αu , αs .β, and A)
for each sector. The other constraint we assume is that there is no decline in
industry-specific technology in either sector (ie Ai cannot decline from period
0 to period 1), based on the assumptions that technological innovations will
not be unlearnt once developed.
For the Ricardo-Viner model, we calibrate capital share coeﬃcients γ i
18

from income shares. The unskilled share parameters, β i , and the labour
quality coeﬃcients, αui and αsu are the same as in the H-O model, while the
Ai scale parameters for labour income are smaller.
Having determined parameter values in each of the models using the calibration procedures described above (which we use for the long-run model
where λu , λs = 0 and the short-run model where λu > 0), we then compute
counterfactual equilibria with each model. Using the 1979 UK price, technology and endowment data as inputs, we compute equilibria for the UK
economy if endowments, prices and/or technological parameters are separately changed to their 1995 model values. We then compare these computed
model equilibria to the actual 1995 data in which all these changes jointly
appear.
Previous studies (eg Abrego and Whalley (2000)) have decomposed the
causes of increased inequality by carrying out simulations, first altering prices,
then technological parameters (or vice-versa). Due to model nonlinearities,
the order of decomposition can make a diﬀerence to how much change is
attributed to which cause. For this reason, we follow a method (similar to
that in Kose and Riezman’s (1999) study of customs unions), in which endowments, trade and technology are changed in a series of small steps (first
1/10 of the total change in endowments, then 1/10 of the total change in
prices and 1/10 of the total change in technology, then repeating the cycle):
19

the smaller the steps, the less order matters.
3.1 Data
We use data for the UK for 1979 and 1995 for our model analyses, similar
to those used by Abrego and Whalley (1999). They use data on skilled and
unskilled employment and wages for two broad categories of industry, taken
from the UK Labour Force Survey. We use an estimate of a 7.9 per cent fall
in the relative price of unskilled imports between 1979 and 1995 based on an
estimated derived by Abrego and Whalley (1999) from Neven and Wyplosz
(1999)4 .
As two of our models have only two factors, against the three in Abrego
and Whalley (1999a), we reallocate income accruing to the fixed factor in
each sector between skilled and unskilled labour in the proportions used in
that sector. Following Abrego and Whalley value added is rounded to equal
gross output.
The 1979 and 1995 UK data we use are shown in Table 1 below. Price and
wage data are in real terms. The rise in the average real wage of unskilled
labour was approximately 23 per cent between 1979 and 19955 , reflecting an
increase in the premium for skilled over unskilled wage rates from 22% in
4

Although Neven and Wyplosz find that prices of imports from OECD countries or from
developing countries do not vary much by sector skill-intensity, imports from developing
countries fall relatively in price to those from OECD countries, and these weigh more
heavily in total UK imports in the skill-intensive sectors.
5
This is calibrated to UK GNP growth — see the UK national accounts 1996 Table 1.3.
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1979 to over 59% in 1995. This occurs despite the ratio of skilled/unskilled
labour inputs rising in both sectors. While there is an increase in the share
of skilled intensive exportables in total production, both sectors show rising
output. The change in industrial structure in the data is therefore a relatively
minor factor compared with what a Heckscher-Ohlin model would usually be
expected to produce in response to the assumed 7.9% fall in the relative
goods prices6 .
The unskilled labour mobility cost, λu , reflects studies which tend to
indicate that unskilled labour may be less mobile between sectors than skilled.
Kruse (1988) suggest unemployment periods in the US are generally longer
for unskilled rather than skilled workers, which, in terms of our model might
suggest a higher threshold wage diﬀerential for the unskilled before they start
to move between sectors. This is borne out by Haynes, Upward and Wright’s
(2000) UK study, which suggest that those with lower skills experience longer
unemployment duration.
We have chosen, for simplicity, to assume that only unskilled labour,
factor U , is aﬀected by mobility costs (ie λs = 0; λu ≥ 0) and we use a
6

With an elasticity of substitution of 1.25 between the two fully-mobile factors, and
starting with output and employment as in our database for 1979, we show complete
specialisation in good X after a price fall of just 6.3% in good M. This corresponds to a
change of nearly 40% in relative skilled wages.Details of this calculation are available on
request from the authors.
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figure of 13.7 % for 19957 , an ‘upper end’ estimate of mobility costs. In later
sensitivity analysis, we also evaluate models with lower values.

This assumes that the 7 34 % diﬀerence in wages between sectors reported by Greenaway et al. (1999) for the UK in 1990 is explained entirely by lower unskilled wages in the
declining sectors, in turn reflecting an unwillingness to move due to mobility costs. We
assume the 7 34 % diﬀerence in average wages comprises no diﬀerential for skilled workers
and a 13.7 % diﬀerential for unskilled.
7
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4. MODEL RESULTS
We use three calibrations to the 1979 and 1995 data: one involving a longrun two-factor model in which all factors are able to move freely in response
to price and technology shocks; a second short-run model in which unskilled
labour is only partially mobile, if intersectoral wage diﬀerentials exceed a
threshold, assumed to be 13.7% of wages; and a third using a three-factor
Ricardo-Viner model with sectorally fixed capital. We concentrate initially
on the case where the elasticity of substitution between factors of production
is 1.25 in both sectors.
Table 2 outlines our decomposition results for observed than actually observed changes in relative wages of skilled and unskilled labour between 1979
and 1995 using these three calibrated models. The contribution of various
causal factors to the observed change in the average skilled to unskilled wage
ratio, which Table 1 indicates increased from 1.22 to 1.59, and is expressed
by the contribution of each causal factor as a percentage of the total change.
In the long-run Heckscher-Ohlin factors mobile model (first column of
numbers), the increase in skilled and fall in unskilled factor endowments has
no eﬀect, as the factor price insensitivity result (due to Leamer and Levinsohn
(1995)) suggests. However, the model shows substantial sensitivity to the
change in world prices, which alone accounts for 152 % of the total observed
wage change. There is also substantial factor bias in favour of the skilled
23

factor (skill bias +184% and factor quality +255%), and rise in the skilled
share of output. These results fit the observed wage and output changes due
to a sizeable sector-biased technical change in the opposite direction (-491%),
favouring the unskilled intensive sector M .
In the second column, the partial mobility model shows diﬀerent results.
The change of endowments has a large eﬀect on relative wages narrowing
the gap between skilled and unskilled wage rates (-92% of the total net
observed change). The eﬀect of world prices is reduced to around 83% of
the observed total wage change, while sector bias, which still favours the
unskilled-intensive good, is also smaller in this model compared to the factors mobile model (-228% of the observed change against -491%). The main
factor in this model behind the increased inequality is the change in the skill
share within industries (187% of the observed change), with a slightly smaller
contribution from factor quality.
The final column of Table 2 reports results for the Ricardo-Viner fixed
factors model sectoral output and employment are less sensitive to price
or sector-biased technical changes. World price changes account for just
19% of the total observed change in relative wages, 1/10 of the change in
the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Sector-biased technical change has a moderate
damping eﬀect on inequality (-43%). The main picture conveyed by this
model is strong factor-biased change within industries (+256% of the ob24

served net change) in favor of skilled labour, oﬀset partially by large eﬀects
of endowment changes (-191%).
Table 3a reports the sensitivity results for the partial mobility model to
changes in the assumed mobility cost. Moving rightward the columns show
adjustment costs for labour increasing from zero (Long-run model) to our
maximum 13.7 %, and shows that the eﬀect of trade in explaining wage
changes falls markedly as the adjustment cost rises, from 152% of total observed changes in the Heckscher-Ohlin case to 83% in our maximum adjustment cost case. The latter is still, however, somewhat larger than estimated
by most other empirical studies of the contribution of trade. But it is worth
noting that even a relatively modest adjustment cost, such as the 5% cost
in our second column, significantly changes the decomposition results compared to Heckscher-Ohlin: the eﬀect of trade is reduced from 152% of the
observed change to 126%.The roles of factor-biased technology changes, in
the opposite direction: the role of endowment changes rises rapidly as factor
mobility costs are introduced.
Table 3b summarizes the sensitivity of the Ricardo-Viner fixed factor
model to diﬀerent assumptions about the share of fixed factors in value added.
The higher the assumed share of fixed factors in value added, the less role for
trade or sector bias and the greater the role of endowment changes. However,
the most revealing column is that where we have assumed just 2% of value
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added consists of fixed factor payments. Even with this low share, the model
behaves very diﬀerently to the Heckscher-Ohlin model: the eﬀect of traded
prices, for example, is cut from 152% of observed changes to 101%. For a 5%
factor share, the price eﬀect is just 65% of total wage changes. This indicates
that the magnitude of Stolper-Samuelson trade eﬀects is not at all robust in
the face of even small amounts of fixed factors.
Table 4 explores the sensitivity of our decomposition results in the three
models to the elasticity of substitution between unskilled and skilled labour
in production, which we set at 0.5 and 2 instead of our central case value of
1.25.
Comparing estimates of the contribution of various factors when the
assumed elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour is
changed shows that the relationship between elasticity and decomposition estimates is neither simple or monotonic. In most cases the eﬀects of skill bias
(positive) and endowments change (negative) on relative wages are higher
when the elasticity of substitution between factors is lower. Factor quality is
more important in explaining relative wage changes with higher substitution
elasticities. The relationship with price changes and sector bias seems to be
non-monotonic.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we compare the use of short-run and long-run trade models
to decompose changes in observed wage inequalities between skilled and unskilled labour over the period 1979-95 for the UK into trade and technology,
and endowment change components. Results of these decompositions are
very diﬀerent depending upon whether a short-run model, with limited mobility of unskilled labour, or a long-run model is used to explain the observed
changes. This emphasises that assumed model structure applied to the same
data in decomposition will substantially aﬀect the perception of the role of
trade in wage inequality change.
In the long-run model, the usual Heckscher-Ohlin result of factor price
insensitivity holds, so that the rise in relative supply of skilled labour has
no eﬀect on skill premia. The factor-bias of technical change has no eﬀect
(except insofar as the relative quality of skilled labour has risen). In contrast,
the eﬀects of observed world price increases are very large: on its own this
price increase would cause a larger shift in output towards the skill-intensive
goods, and a larger rise in skill premia than actually observed. The long-run
model can only be made consistent with the observed output and income
changes if the sector-bias of technical change (the residual category of the
decomposition) is in the opposite direction: for UK total factor productivity
in the unskilled-intensive sector to have risen faster than in the skill-intensive
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sector, so damping the tendency of output to switch.
By contrast, when we use a short-run model for these decompositions,
one in which, unskilled labour is only partially mobile, the decomposition
results are quite diﬀerent. The rise in the relative supply of unskilled labour
now has a sizeable damping eﬀect on inequality.

Factor-biased technical

change (leading to a rise in skilled/unskilled input ratios in both sectors) despite rising skill premia will raise relative skilled wages in a short-run model.
The eﬀect of trade is less marked in the short-run model, though still quite
substantial. The sector-bias in technical progress (which had been large and
favoured the unskilled-intensive sector in the long-run model) is relatively
minor in our short-run model.
The other short-run model specification we examine is a Ricardo-Viner
model, where capital is assumed to be fixed. The eﬀects of this are even
more marked than in the partial mobility case - prices and sector-biased
technical change move only a small eﬀect, while factor-biased change is the
main cause of insensitivity in inequality, oﬀset by endowment changes. Sensitivity analysis shows that, even when only a small proportion of valued
added is linked to fixed factors; the model is greatly changed compared to
the Hecksher-Ohlin formulation.
There are a number of reasons we believe for the short-run model decomposition to be the more plausible. First, the sign of the sector bias in
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our calibrated long-run model is contrary to what comparisons the eﬀects of
computerisation on wage inquality (eg by Haskel and Slaughter would indicate. Second, the eﬀects of labour upskilling and of factor-biased technical
change in the short-term models are more consistent with what studies by
labour economists would indicate (eg Borjas et al., 1992; Murphy and Welch,
1991; and Katz and Murphy, 1992)
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SUMMARY TABLES
Table 1

1979 and 1995 UK data used in calibrating short-run models

Labour input (billions of
hours)

Hourly wage pounds per
week
1995 prices

Unskilled

1979
36.0

1995
24.3

Skilled
Total

19.0
55.0

33.4
57.7

Good E

Unskilled
Skilled
Total

24.3
33.4
57.7

60.3
52.4
112.7

Total

Unskilled
Skilled
Total

60.3
52.4
112.7

84.6
85.8
170.3

Average

Unskilled

5.47

6.45

Skilled

6.67

10.23

1.22

1.59

Good M

100.0

134.0

Good E

100.0

138.1

Good M
Good E

1
1

0.921
1

47.49%

44.70%

Good M

Average wage ratio
Output index (1979 volume
= 100)
Goods prices (1979 = 1)
Importables (good M) as %
of total
value added

Table 2

Model Decompositions of Wage Inequality: Change for Central Case
Specifications.

Component Factors
Factors Mobile
Short
Behind Inequality Change
Run
Long Run Model Adjustment Cost
Model
World Price Change
(Trade)
Technology
Sector bias
Skill bias
Capital bias
Factor quality
Endowments change
Total

Ricardo Viner
Short Run Fixed
Factors Model

152%

83%

19%

-491%
184%
0%
255%

-228%
187%
0%
151%

-43%
256%
-8%
67%

0%

-92%

-191%

100%

100%

100%

Table 3a Sensitivity of Model Based Decompositions in Short Run Models to
Key Parameters
Percent of total change in ratio of skilled/unskilled earnings.
Component
Long-run
Factors Behind Model
Inequality
Change
World Price
Change
Technology
Sector bias
Skill bias
Capital bias
Factor quality
Endowments
change
Total

152%

Short-Run Adjustment Cost Model

Adjustment cost coefficient
5%
10%
14%
126%
99%
83%

-491%
184%
0%
255%

-387%
186%
0%
212%

-288%
186%
0%
173%

-228%
187%
0%
151%

0%

-37%

-70%

-92%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Table 3 b

Percent of total change in ratio of skilled/unskilled earnings.

Component Factors Behind
Inequality Change
Longrun
Model

Ricardo-Viner
Short-Run Fixed
Factors Model
Fixed Factor Share
Parameter
2%
5%

10%

20%

30%

World Price Change
Technology
Sector bias
Skill bias
Capital bias
Factor quality

152%

101%

65%

41%

24%

17%

-491%
184%
0%
255%

-324%
204%
0%
188%

-201%
207%
0%
137%

-119%
210%
0%
102%

-60%
213%
0%
77%

-36%
214%
0%
66%

Endowments change

0%

-70%

-108%

-134%

-153%

-161%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total

Table 4

Elasticity Sensitivity of Model Based Decompositions

Component Factors Behind
Inequality Change

Factors Mobile
Long-run Model

Short-Run
Adjustment Cost
Model

Ricardo-Viner
Short-Run Fixed
Factors Model

Substitution elasticity between skilled and unskilled set at 0.5
World Price Change
(Trade)
Technology

Sector bias
Skill bias
Capital bias
Factor quality
Endowments change
Total
World Price Change
(Trade)

Technology

Sector bias
Skill bias
Capital bias
Factor quality
Endowments change
Total

Technology

86%

41%

34%

-330%
310%
0%
54%

-137%
315%
0%
-6%

-106%
631%
-8%
-83%

0%

-113%

-369%

120%
100%
100%
Substitution elasticity between skilled and unskilled set at 1.25
152%

83%

19%

-491%
184%
0%
255%

-228%
187%
0%
151%

-43%
256%
-8%
67%

0%

-92%

-191%

100%
100%
100%
Substitution elasticity between skilled and unskilled set at 2

World Price Change
(Trade)

155%

67%

12%

Sector bias
Skill bias
Capital bias
Factor quality

-400%
42%
0%
303%

-132%
19%
0%
221%

-22%
64%
-5%
171%

0%

-75%

-120%

100%

100%

100%

Endowments change
Total

